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Policymaking has a long and complex history in long-term care, which is one of the most
highly regulated industries in the United States. The Final Rule for Reform of Requirements of
Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities was published with Phase I of III effective
November 26, 2016. A retrospective program evaluation using data from the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Nursing Home Compare was conducted of 14,210 SNFs/
NFs. This study used a quantitative approach to determine the impact of the RoP on four quality
measures: percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic, long-stay residents
with moderate to severe pain, long-stay residents who were physically restrained, and short-stay
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened. Data was analyzed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. Significant changes were observed in the
percentage of each of the four quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the RoP.
Logistic models indicate the influence of ownership and location on quality measure percentages
RoP. This study adds to existing literature regarding the impact of regulatory stringency on
nursing homes and provides important recommendations for policymakers and future research.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Policymaking has a long and complex history in long-term care, which is one of the most
highly regulated industries in the U.S. (Brady, 2001; Eskildsen & Price, 2009; Kumar et al,
2006). In 2016, the Final Rule for Reform of Requirements of Participation (RoP) for LongTerm Care Facilities was published with Phase I of III effective November 28, 2016 (Medicare
& Medicaid Programs, 2016). The Final Rule was the first overhaul of regulations for long-term
care facilities since 1991. The cost of implementing the new regulatory requirements, per
facility, is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000 per year thereafter
(Medicare & Medicaid Programs, 2016; Unroe, Ouslander & Saliba, 2017).
There is little research available pertaining to the impact of the 2016 RoP for long-term
care facilities. There is research, however, demonstrating a lack of evidence to support
improvements in the quality of care provided by nursing homes due to regulations; therefore, the
addition of more regulations may not be effective in improving quality of care (Brady, 2001). As
stated by Brady (2001), “to the extent that there are problems with the quality of care provided
by certain nursing homes, those problems do not exist because of a lack of regulation” (p.5).
Though nursing homes are often referred to as long-term care facilities, most offer shortterm skilled nursing and rehabilitation services in addition to long-term care services. Skilled
Nursing Facilities (SNFs) are certified to receive Medicare funding for services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries, often referred to as short-stay patients or residents. Nursing Facilities
(NFs) provide long-term care services through Medicaid or personal (private) funds.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contract with each State to
enforce nursing home regulations (Mukamel et al, 2012). State Surveyors, employed by Health
and Human Services, are required to conduct certification surveys for Medicare and/ or Medicaid
10

certified SNFs/ NF every 9 to 15 months. The ‘annual survey’ is an assessment of the facility’s
compliance with over 150 standards which must be met to continue to receive funding through
Medicare and/ or Medicaid (Castle & Ferguson, 2010). Additionally, surveyors must investigate
consumer complaints, sometimes resulting in additional compliance surveys. Deficiencies are
cited for areas not meeting standard(s) and require a plan of correction be submitted by the
facility within 10 days. Scope and severity are assigned for each deficient area and can result in
civil monetary penalties (CMPs), loss of funding, and/ or mandated changes in leadership.
According to Winzelberg (2003), the punitive approach to regulation or nursing homes will
continue to be ineffective in improving quality of care due to the unique service population and
environment in each home. Additionally, though the regulations and process are outlined in a
standardized approach, there is discrepancy amongst different surveyors and states regarding
how and which homes are cited and at what scope and severity.
Nursing homes continue to experience significant cuts in Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement (Siegel et al, 2014) and a critical staffing shortage (JCAHO, 2014). In the State
of New Hampshire alone, the average daily cost to provide care and services per nursing home
resident is under-funded by Medicaid by $46.39 (American Health Care Association, 2017). The
lack of evidence demonstrating the beneficial effects of increased regulatory scrutiny and high
costs of compliance in achieving improved quality of care is a difficult sell to providers and
consumers (Walshe, 2001).
The purpose of this research project is to gain understanding of the impact of the 2016
RoP (Phase I) on resident care. This will enable providers to gain a better understanding of the
impact of the RoP, the results of their efforts to comply with the regulations and provide
policymakers with data regarding the impact of the RoP.
11

The demand for nursing home care is expected to increase in the coming decades
(Eskildsen & Price, 2009). The 65 and over population is expected to increase from 12% in 2005
to 20% by 2050 (Cohn & Taylor, 2010; Hoffman, 2018). The annual turnover rate for licensed
Nursing Home Administrators is estimated at 57% (Siegel, Leo, Young & Castle, 2014),
primarily attributed to the challenging regulatory environment and shortage of nursing staff
(AHCA, 2014; Angelilli, Gifford, Shah & Mor, 2001; Castle, N., 2006). The negative aspects of
these regulations and requirements on resident choice and quality of life, the burnout and
turnover of staff, the unsatisfied residents and family members, and the lack of evidence
supporting improved quality of care is exasperating. It is important to understand the effects of
these regulatory changes on the nursing home environment, including patients, residents,
families, staff, and other stakeholders. This research seeks to provide a better understanding of
the process and reasoning behind the changes in regulations, and what if any benefits will be
experienced by the consumer in respect to improved quality of care.
Background and Need
In the mid- 1900s, poorhouses were established in the United States as a place for the
poor and infirm to reside. Poor houses were supported with federal tax dollars, and eventually
became the nursing home as we know it today (Winzelberg, 2003). As part of the establishment
of the Social Security Act in 1935, management of the funding of benefits for the aged were
transitioned to State agencies (ssa.gov, n.d.). During this time, there were several concerns
raised by both the public and political sectors regarding the poor conditions and quality of care in
nursing homes (IOM, 1986), though the licensing and/ or regulatory process was discouraged
due to the increasing need for nursing homes and beds (Winzelberg, 2003). During the 1930s
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and 1940s, the sense was that most nursing homes could not meet the basic requirements of the
regulatory process and therefore would have been forced to close.
In the 1950s, a study conducted by the Council of State Governments found that nursing
homes were not providing quality services (IOM, 1986) and many were considered
‘substandard.’ From this study, the Public Health Service began consideration of licensing
programs at the state level (IOM, 1986). Through these processes, many homes continued to be
labeled as ‘substandard’, though the continued fear of enforcement shutting down the operations
of the homes prohibited pursuance of the issues as it was thought that it would take time for
homes to comply with standards (United States Special Committee on Aging, 1975).
By 1961, the United States Senate had created the Special Committee on Aging, chaired
by Utah Senator Frank Moss (IOM, 1986). The Committee held several hearings on the issues
that had been experienced in nursing homes, and by 1963, the first standards for nursing homes
receiving Federal funding were issued (IOM, 1986). Two years later, in 1965, Amendments to
the Social Security Act created the Medicare (healthcare coverage for those 65 and over) and
Medicaid (healthcare coverage for low income individuals) programs (Eskildsen & Price, 2009).
By 1966, the percentage of nursing home residents receiving Medicaid was over 60% (IOM,
1986). The demands made by members of Congress, consumers, and advocacy groups for
nursing homes receiving federal funding to meet basic standards and requirements was profound.
In the 1970s, nursing homes garnered the attention of the public and policymakers due to
negative outcomes including abuse, bed sores, and poor care (Kapp, 2014). Under the Nixon
Administration, oversight of nursing home regulations transitioned from the State to the Federal
level (Hovey, 2000). Frank Moss (D-UT), Chair of the Special Committee on Aging went
undercover as a Medicaid resident to undergo the experience personally (Etzioni, 1977). From
13

this experience, the Moss Committee (IOM, 1986) was established and began holding hearings
over a 4-year period to establish testimony against federal regulatory efforts. Stories continued
to be published regarding the horrors of nursing homes; a fire that killed 32 residents in a nursing
home in Ohio, food poisoning that killed 36 residents in a nursing home in Maryland, and a class
action lawsuit, Smith v. O’Halloran, was filed in Colorado by a group of nursing home residents
receiving Medicaid (Horowitz, 2009). The lawsuit claimed that the federal government, and
specifically the Secretary of HHS, had not followed through on their responsibilities to ensure
quality of care in nursing homes, and they had suffered needlessly because of it.
In 1980, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) proposed changes to nursing
home rules to include evaluation of the care provided to residents (IOM, 1986). These proposed
changes were not passed into law and remained in a holding pattern through the end of the Carter
administration. A new reform effort was initiated by the incoming Reagan Administration, who
sought to streamline the regulations for nursing homes (Kapp, 2014) and allow for facilities with
good survey and certification records to achieve compliance through accreditation by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (American Association of Homes and Services for the
Aging, 2008). These proposed changes produced negative reactions from several stakeholders,
including lawmakers, consumers, and providers (IOM, 1986). Most believed that the proposed
changes did not address the “fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory system” (AAHSA, 2008,
p.17). The reactions resulted in the proposed changes to nursing home regulations being
postponed and left the prior rules from 1974 in effect. Additionally, during this time, a federal
court ruled that Medicaid Law requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to prove that
providers receiving federal funds are meeting the requirements of participation in the program,
including quality of care (Brady, 2001).
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In 1983, Congress asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct a review of nursing
home performance. The 18- month study of nursing home issues by the IOM Committee
resulted in numerous regulatory recommendations per members of the committee, few of which
were supported by evidenced-based research or outcomes (Kapp, 2014). In addition to the IOM
Committee findings and recommendations, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a
report detailing its concerns with the lack of oversight of nursing homes by DHHS (Horowitz,
2009). The “window of opportunity” (Longest, 2016, p.136) was provided for stricter regulatory
oversight due to the ongoing, publicized issues with nursing homes, along with the Smith v.
O’Halloran case “winding its way through courts” (Horowitz, 2009, p. 2). As such, Congress
chose to take the recommendations and incorporated them as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987, also known as the Nursing Home Reform Act (Brady,
2001).
Over the next two decades, there was little evidence that the influx of regulatory
requirements on the long-term care industry had any effect on improving resident outcomes or
quality of care. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) was introduced in 1991, requiring SNFs/ NFs to
assess residents health status and capabilities in performing activities of daily living (ADLs)
(Castle & Ferguson, 2010). The MDS is comprised of 350 areas of assessment completed for
each short-stay and long-term resident in the SNF/ NF (Au et al, 2019; Eskildsen & Price, 2009;
Grabowski et al, 2008). The MDS is completed on minimum of a quarterly basis and transmitted
to CMS where it is analyzed. The data from MDS is aggregated to provide information at the
facility, state, and national level for twenty-eight publicly reported quality measures (QMs)
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019; Mor, 2005). MDS data is also used to
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determine reimbursement rates and provide surveyors with focus areas for observation during
regulatory compliance visits (Rahman & Applebaum, 2009).
Quality measures (QMs) were developed by the Center for Health Systems Research and
Analysis to provide indicators of structural, procedural, and outcome measures (Castle &
Ferguson, 2010). QMs were first publicly reported in 2002 as part of Nursing Home Compare.
Despite the “overwhelmingly extensive and complex set of formal command-and-control rules
we [have] promulgated on the federal and state levels to govern the operation of nursing homes”
(Kapp, 2014, p.886-887) the industry continued to experience significant quality of care issues
(Kumar, Norton & Ensinosa, 2006) as evidenced by continued citations of actual harm and
immediate jeopardy survey results. The idea of “deemed status” (Hovey, 2000, p.52) emerged
again in 1998, as it had in the 1980’s, proposing the idea of allowing accreditation through
JCAHO (similar to oversight of hospitals) to improve quality and decrease the costs of regulatory
oversight. This idea was quickly dismissed due to opposition from the Clinton Administration,
interest groups such as AARP, stating JCAHO did not meet the necessary standards of oversight
required for nursing homes (Hovey, 2000).
In 2005, CMS began the pilot of a new survey process in five states to achieve a more
systematic, objective approach to the survey process and address the ongoing concerns expressed
by the GAO and Congress regarding the regulatory oversight of nursing homes. The Quality
Indicator Survey (QIS) was developed in response to criticisms of the current process for survey
and certification in nursing homes which had been voiced by consumers, providers, Congress,
GAO, survey agencies as well as CMS (White et al, 2007). The goals of the QIS survey were to
increase the accuracy and efficiency of the survey process in addition to providing increased
focus on resident- centered care and quality outcomes (AAHSA, 2008).
16

A 2007 study completed by ABT found the QIS survey failed to attain any of its primary
goals (White et al, 2007). The study assessed quality in the five domains of incontinence,
nutrition, pressure ulcers, choice, and activities. There were no differences found in accuracy or
relationship between quality and citations received by facilities undergoing the QIS and standard
survey (White et al, 2007) and “both failed to detect many residents with poor pressure ulcer and
weight loss outcomes” (White et al, 2007, p. v).
On May 15, 2008, Congressman Stupak (D-MI) requested release of the CMS report
regarding the evaluation of the QIS pilot at a Meeting of the House Committee on Energy &
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (AAHSA, 2008). He was told that
the report was not available by the Acting Administrator of CMS, Kerry Weems, who cited that
it was still being finalized and an action plan was being developed prior to making the report
available to the Committee (AAHSA, 2008). This report was not made available to the
Committee until the following summer, as CMS did not wish the Committee to see the failure of
the attempt to improve the survey and certification process through the new QIS process (White
et al, 2007).
The micro aspect of the regulatory process is met with disdain by providers due to the
punitive and disheartening survey process (Walshe, 2001). Consumers (patients, residents,
family members) have mixed feelings about these policies. Some are frustrated with the
stringent ‘rules’ that come as part of the regulatory process and inhibit their ability to live in their
home; simple pleasures such as a choice of curtains, having a coffee maker, or keeping eye drops
at their bedside become non-existent due to the need to achieve regulatory compliance (Kapp,
2000). At the local, state, and national levels, stakeholders deploy a variety of methods to have
their voices heard and participate in policymaking.
17

Federalism is well represented when it comes to policymaking and regulatory oversight
of long-term care facilities (Longest, 2016; Walshe, 2001). Every level of government is
involved in a specific way, with a great deal of overlap. The Requirements of Participation
(RoP) are finalized in the Legislative Branch, and implemented by the Executive Branch,
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The RoP, or regulations, are monitored and
enforced at both the State and Federal levels. At the local level, many cities, towns, and/ or
counties have their own requirements and/ or regulations pertaining to nursing homes, such as
licensure for convalescent care or food licensing. Furthermore, skilled nursing and long-term
care facilities are reimbursed for care and services provided to most residents by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (Medicare beneficiaries) and by State Departments of Health and
Human Services (Medicaid beneficiaries), the same agencies responsible for ensuring regulatory
compliance.
Historically, policy actors have capitalized on the opportunity to draw attention to
adverse stories of nursing homes and “play on the fears of the politically powerful baby boom
generation” (Brady, 2001, p.3) to gain votes by advocating for tougher regulatory oversight.
Reviewing the history of regulations in long-term care, there are several examples of “legislators
as suppliers” (Longest, 2016, p. 69); from the Congressman that shared his own story as an
orderly in a nursing home during the Moss hearings (IOM, 1986) to support the need for
additional regulations to address the poor care and neglect he witnessed, to the experienced
shared by Moss himself as an ‘undercover’ resident of a nursing home (Etzioni, 1977). As stated
by Hovey (2000), “every time an expose of poor nursing home care is presented in the media,
there is a call among our political leaders to crack down on the nursing home industry” (p.43).
These dynamics can result in policy decisions that are made quickly to appease voters and gain
18

votes, without consideration for the long-term impact of the costs, both to providers (costs to
comply) and regulators (cost to enforce) (Longest, 2016). Alternatively, Hoffman (2018) argues
that public choice theory deters politicians from focusing on issues pertaining to the aging
population due to the high cost of funding programs. Hoffman believes there is a general
tendency of political actors and the public to avoid the ‘non-glamorous’ issues of aging and
mortality as they are generally viewed as unpleasant and do not assist in gaining votes.
In 2015, CMS published the Proposed Rule outlining substantial changes to the
regulations for long-term care, the first of its kind since OBRA in 1987 (Unroe, Ouslander &
Saliba, 2017). Thousands of public comments were made, resulting in changes in the effective
date(s) of the proposed regulations. The purpose of the final rule is to update regulatory
requirements for SNFs/ NFs to meet the needs of both short-stay and long-term care residents, as
well as the differences in acuity of the population as compared to twenty-five years prior. The
final rule, published in October 2016, is arranged to be implemented in three phases (Figure 1)
(Unroe, Ouslander & Saliba, 2017).
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Figure 1. Requirements of Participation: Phases I, II, III, and Effective Dates

Phase I (November 28, 2016)
Basis and Scope
Definitions
Resident Rights
Infection Control
Abuse, Neglect, Exploitation
Physical Environment
Admission, Transfer, Discharge
Resident Assessment
Comprehensive Person-Centered
Care Plan
Quality of Life
Quality of Care
Physician Services
Nursing Services
Pharmacy Services
Laboratory, Radiology, Diagnostic
Services
Dental Services
Food and Nutrition Services
Specialized Rehabilitation Services
Administration

Phase II (November 28, 2017)
Facility Assessment
Phase III (November 28,
QAPI Plan
2019)
Antibiotic Stewardship
Smoking Policies
Trauma Informed Care
Behavioral Health Services
QAPI Implementation
Resident Rights: Advocacy Groups,
Medicare and Medicaid Eligibility Infection Preventionist
Compliance and Ethics Program
Reporting Crimes per Elder Justice
Training Requirements
Act 1150B
Resident Rights: Call System at Each
Required Documentation of
Bedside
Admission, Transfer, and
Discharge
Baseline Care Plan within 48 Hours of
Admission

Source: Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017)
Problem Statement
Long-term care has a lengthy history of stringent regulations developed in response to
highly publicized poor outcomes (Eskildsen & Price, 2009). Phase I of the Medicare and
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities went into effect on
November 27, 2016. According to Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017), the cost of
implementing these rules is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000
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per year thereafter. However, it is not known if these costly new rules have any impact on
quality of care.
Research Question and Research Hypotheses
How do CMS quality measures (QMs) compare pre- and post-implementation of Phase I
of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities?
H1. The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H2. The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will
decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H3. The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline postimplementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
The four quality measures (QMs) included in this study were selected for several reasons.
These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward, 2016) and exist as publicly
reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase I RoP. Additionally, all
have been utilized as indicators of quality of care in SNFs/NFs in prior studies (Castle &
Ferguson, 2010; Grabowski et al, 2008; Kapp, 2000; Kumar, Norton & Encinosa, 2006; Wade,
2016) and in quality initiatives such as Advancing Excellence and the National Nursing Home
Quality Improvement Campaign (http://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/). According to Castle &
Ferguson (2010), the QMs selected for this study are “quality indicators used in prominent
quality initiatives” (p. 433). The QMs have been gathered and publicly reported by CMS since
21

2008; three of the four QMs in this study have been publicly reported since 2010 (see Table 3).
Population
This is a retrospective program evaluation of quality of care using data from Nursing
Home Compare. Nursing Home Compare data are collected by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid (CMS) Nursing Home Compare MDS Quality Measures (QMs). This data is derived
from nursing home resident’s Minimum Data Set (MDS), transmitted to CMS by Medicare and
Medicaid certified facilities. The files are available to the public for all nursing home-based
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and nursing facilities (NFs), and exclude critical access hospital
(CAH) swing beds. QMs are available on a national level and provide information about the
quality of care provided in SNFs/ NFs (Castle & Ferguson, 2010). The variables needed for each
of the measures are publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Nursing
Home Compare online database. Data sets were compared for the year prior to implementation
(January to December 2015) and one year after (January to December 2017) the change in the
RoP for 14,210 SNFs/ NFs in the United States.
Three of the overarching themes of the Phase I RoP include Pharmacy Services, Resident
Rights, and Quality of Care. For purposes of this study, the corresponding quality measure(s) are
matched with the Phase I component (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Phase I Requirements of Participation and Corresponding Quality Measures

Pharmacy
Services

•Percentage of longstay residents who
got an antipsychotic
medication

•Percentage of longstay residents who
were physically
restrained

Resident
Rights

Quality of
Care
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•Percentage of short-stay residents
with pressure ulcers that are new
or worsened
•Percentage of long-stay residents
who self-report moderate to severe
pain

CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted in Chapter I, there is limited empirical evidence pertaining to the effects of
increased regulations on quality of care in skilled nursing facilities. Reference to regulatory
stringency and quality improvement in evidence-based studies conducted apropos nursing home
quality measures and improvement initiatives is scant (Kumar et al, 2006). Several sources of
literature were reviewed through EMbase, MEDLINE, Scopus, and HEINOnline. Keywords
include regulatory requirements, Medicare regulations, skilled nursing facilities, quality of care,
and quality measures as well as Boolean operator (AND). Studies, articles, and books pertaining
to quality measures and regulatory oversight in skilled nursing facilities over the past twenty-five
years were reviewed.
Most of the literature reviewed contemplate the relationships between quality measures
and five-star ratings, the scrutiny of the regulatory process, and the flaws in regulatory oversight
(Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Levenson, 2010; Walshe, 2001). OBRA regulations were
implemented in 1987, however, quality measures were not developed and implemented until
2002 (Grabowski et al, 2008). Therefore, it is possible that prior studies did not have
comparison groups or the ability to measure quality of care and the effect of regulatory changes
pre- and post-implementation (Walshe, 2001). The RoP of 2016 is the first major overhaul of
SNF regulations since 1991; the addition of the quality measures in 2002 allows for
measurement of the effectiveness of regulatory stringency on quality of care.
Regulations and Quality of Care
In his article, Winzelberg (2003) argues the regulation of nursing homes over the past 50
years has not ensured or improved quality of care in skilled nursing facilities/ nursing facilities
(SNFs/ NFs). Despite the implementation of the OBRA regulations, concerns continue to arise
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regarding the quality of care provided in SNFs/NFs. Determining whether the regulations
themselves, and/ or the enforcement of such are the issue remains a challenge for researchers
(Kapp, 2000; Winzelberg, 2003). Increases in civil monetary penalties for deficiencies and
increased transparency via mandatory public reporting have yet to resolve the issue. Despite the
lack of evidence proving the effectiveness of increased regulations, policymakers continue to
believe this is the best way to ensure quality of care.
Traditionally, SNF/NF deficiencies cited during annual or complaint surveys conducted
by state agencies are used to determine the level of quality in nursing homes. There are
numerous issues with the process, foremost being the inconsistency amongst surveyors and State
survey teams in the number and levels of citations (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Winzelberg, 2003).
The number of differences amongst SNFs presents an additional challenge to defining quality.
Approximately 90% of SNFs/NFs receive Medicare and Medicaid funding in the United States
(Mukamel et al, 2011). Though all are part of the same comparison group, they vary in the types
of care, comorbidities, and population they service. Additionally, States vary in philosophies
pertaining to regulation and control of markets, some having a higher level of regulatory
stringency compared with others. Comparing survey results as a means of defining levels of
quality of care becomes increasingly challenging considering these differences. A change to
accreditation to improve quality of care in nursing homes, along with a process to promote
innovative practices is suggested (Kapp, 2000; Winzelberg, 2003). Standardization of the survey
process and the development of programs to allow surveyors to focus on the homes requiring a
higher level of oversight and separating the survey and enforcement agencies to decrease
potential conflicts of interest are also suggested.
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The consequences for non-compliance with regulatory standards include fines, citations,
and mandatory personnel changes (Mukamel et al, 2012). Enforcement agencies and providers
incur these costs of compliance. A quantitative study by Mukamel et al. (2012) utilized 2005
and 2006 MDS data for 16,352 Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes in the United
States to determine the effect of regulations on quality. The objective of the study was to
determine if stringent quality regulations are cost-effective and contribute to better quality
nursing home care. The study considered structural, process, and outcome measures of quality.
The study addressed the endogeneity between regulations and quality by utilizing instrumental
variables. The Harrington Regulation Stringency Index (HRSI) was used as a cost measure. Z
scores were calculated for average deficiencies (citations) per facility, percent of facilities with
any deficiencies, percent of facilities with deficiencies of G level scope and severity or greater,
percent of facilities substandard, and civil monetary penalties per facility. Logistic regression
allowed for the calculation of risk-adjusted rates by facility, with a score of 1 or greater
indicating worse than average, less than one indicating better than average quality. The study
controlled for competition, market median income, hospital wage index, 2004 Medicaid rates,
facility size, ownership, hospital, multi-facility organization, and staffing standards. Two-stage
least-squares models were estimated for each of seven quality measures to analyze the
relationship between regulation and quality.
Results of the study found significant discrepancies in HRSI and quality measures
amongst States. Four of the seven areas of quality outlined in the study, including CNA and
LPN staffing, urinary incontinence, and ADL decline were found to improve with increased
regulatory stringency. RN staffing, high-risk pressure ulcers, and hotel expenditures were not
found to be statistically significant in relation to regulatory stringency. From a comparative
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effectiveness standpoint, the authors pose the question of regulatory stringency versus increasing
competition and transparency regarding care outcomes (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Mukamel et
al, 2012). Overall, the study reports competition is more effective than regulatory stringency in
ensuring quality of care, however, regulation is more effective in ensuring quality than progress
reports.
In the United States, Medicaid is the primary payer for nursing home care, accounting for
sixty to seventy percent of nursing home bed days (Grabowski et al, 2008; Hoffman, 2018). In
2015, the average Medicaid shortfall in the US was -11.8% (AHCA, 2016). While Medicare
funding can make up for some of the deficit, SNF/NF margins continue to decline, totally 12.5%
in 2015. Because Medicare accounts for a much smaller percent of bed days, approximately
14.2% in 2014, total margins were -2.5% in 2015. Private rates can be increased to offset some
of the deficit; however, only 10-20% of nursing home bed days are reimbursed with private
funds, including long-term care insurance (AHCA, 2016; Hoffman, 2018). The regulatory
mandates to increase levels of nursing staff, including Registered Nurses (RNs), Licensed
Practical Nurses (LPNs) and Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) is expensive, considering there
are no increases in reimbursement levels to support doing so. A study by Bowblis (2015) used
1999-2004 Medicare Cost Reports and OSCAR data for 13,318 nursing homes to determine the
financial impact on SNFs after implementation of the minimum staffing requirements
regulations. Medicare and Medicaid provided seventy-five percent of the funding for the SNFs
included in the study. Bowblis’ study references the unintended negative consequences of
regulators attempting to improve quality of care actually having the opposite effect by causing
SNFs to endure a deficit, resulting in a negative impact on resident quality of care. Levenson
(2010) stresses the importance of adequate reimbursement and incentives to allow providers to
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meet quality standards. Payment policies must consider the acuity, needs, and preferences of the
resident as opposed to diagnosis or issue.
Quality Measures and Quality of Care
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) utilizes data from the MDS to
calculate publicly reported quality measures for nursing homes (Wade, 2016). The QM data was
developed to assist consumers in obtaining information about quality of care in nursing homes.
Data is updated quarterly and publicly available on the Nursing Home Compare website
(medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare). The data represent process and outcome measures;
however, they do not capture engagement measures such as satisfaction and relationships with
caregivers (Kapp, 2000).
The four quality measures selected for the study, including percentage of short-stay
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who
self-report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically
restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who got an antipsychotic medication were
chosen for several reasons. These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward,
2016) and exist as publicly reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase
I RoP. Prior studies have utilized pressure ulcers, restraints, pain, and antipsychotic use as
measurements of quality of care (Miller et al, 2014; Mukamel et al, 2012). Mukamel (2012)
included MDS data for decline in ADLs, high-risk pressure ulcers, and urinary incontinence as
outcome measures of quality.
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Table 1. CMS Quality Measures and Implementation Dates

Quality Measure

Short-Stay

Long-Stay

Date Implemented

Percent of Residents
with Pressure Ulcers
that are New or
Worsened

10/1/2010

Percent of residents
who self-report
moderate to severe
pain

10/1/2010

Percent of Residents
who were Physically
Restrained

10/1/2010

Percent of Residents
who Received an
Antipsychotic
Medication

4/1/2012

Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2019)
A study by Grabowski et al. (2008) used MDS data for 12 quality indicators to determine
the effect of payer source on nursing home quality. The study collected OSCAR data to
determine descriptive statistics for the 1.6 million residents included in the study. Payer
information for each of the seven States included in the study was obtained from each Medicaid
office. Linear regression models tested the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables (payer status and quality indicators, respectively). The results indicated consistency in
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quality of care amongst payer sources, specifically Medicaid, in comparison with higher paying
sources including Medicare and private resources.
A study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Swafford, Miller, Tsai, Herr,
and Ersek, 2009) conducted a literature synthesis to find evidenced-based information regarding
the effectiveness and improvement activities pertaining to pain management in nursing homes.
A total of 472 articles were initially reviewed by the lead author, with 419 excluded for not
meeting the specific criteria of the study. The remaining 53 articles were reviewed by two
authors, with 10 meeting the final criteria for the study specific to systematic approaches to pain
practices in nursing homes. The research found the most successful programs following a
quality improvement methodology, with the use of established pain management quality
improvement teams, ongoing education, and support from internal and/ or external consultants.
A process for ongoing monitoring and revisions of the program, as well as the use of tools and
resources for pain assessment and interventions were suggested. Additionally, opportunities to
work with other facilities to foster sharing of best practices and support were also determined to
have a meaningful effect on the improvement of pain management practices in nursing homes.
The practices in the literature varied from the use of MDS data to verbal pain reporting
processes (Swafford et al, 2009). A statistically significant impact on the assessment and
management of pain was noted for facilities receiving education, support, and/ or utilizing a
quality improvement methodology. The study noted the critical elements of successful pain
management programs as those of organizational structure, assessment and management of pain
processes, educational opportunities, and measurement of pain.
Pressure ulcers reflect staffing levels and competency of staff, which are meaningful
indicators of quality of care (Blankart, Foster & Mor, 2019; Gruneir & Mor, 2008). Pressure
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ulcers have a significant impact on quality of life, including risk of infection, decrease in
ambulatory status, pain, an increased need for care and services, and risk of mortality. Financial
implications for both provider and resident range between $10,000 and $86,000 (Clarke et al,
2005) per pressure ulcer. A study by Au et al. (2019) references the beneficial impact of quality
improvement methodologies in the management of skin integrity processes (systems) in SNFs.
A proactive approach to pressure ulcer prevention, including staffing levels, equipment,
reimbursement rates, and training, is a notable measure of quality of care (Gruneir & Mor, 2008).
Important components include the ability to assess, document, and track measurements and
characteristics for existing wounds.
According to CMS (Reform of Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, 2016) and
several studies, antipsychotic utilization is another important indicator of quality of care (Lau,
Kasper, Potter & Lyles, 2004; Lucas et al, 2014). The reform created a new category of
regulations under ‘Pharmacy Services’, moving antipsychotic regulations from the quality of
care category. Despite this change, the use of psychotropic drugs is considered an indicator of
quality of care, defined by CMS as achieving or maintaining the highest level of well-being
according to patient-directed preferences and care needs.
In the United States, over 50% of nursing home residents have a diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease or another dementia (Harris-Kojetin et al., 2016). Most of these patients
have lost their ability to communicate verbally and non-verbally due to the progression of the
disease. This loss of ability to communicate results in patients demonstrative aggressive,
paranoid, sometimes destructive behaviors (Salzman, 2013). Medications such as
benzodiazepines and antidepressants have been utilized to treat these behavioral and
psychological symptoms of dementia (BPSD) in the past with minimal results (Triforo, Sultana
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& Spina, 2014). Due to the lack of effective medications, providers turned to antipsychotic
medications to treat these patients (Salzman, 2013). Additionally, the use of physical restraints
has been associated with higher rates of injury in SNF/ NF residents (Neufeld et al, 1999).
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) conducted a study in 2006 to
determine the effects of antipsychotics on the rate of mortality for elderly patients with dementia
(Maglione et al, 2011). The study found the mortality rate for those receiving antipsychotics to
be 3.5% as compared to 2.3% for those receiving the placebo (Maglione et al, 2011). In 2007,
the Office of Inspector General embarked on a study at the request of Senator Charles Grassley
regarding the use of antipsychotic medications in nursing home residents (Levinson, 2011). The
results of the study were published in 2011, reporting that approximately 14% of nursing home
residents with dementia received an antipsychotic medication for a diagnosis unrelated to those
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA black box warning
specifically reads “increased mortality in elderly patients with dementia related psychosis”
(Levinson, 2011, p.4). Though the drugs are approved for use in patients diagnosed with
Huntington’s disease, Tourette’s disorder and schizophrenia, they are commonly used for
nursing home patients with diagnoses of dementia with psychosis or dementia with behavioral
disturbances. This information, in addition to the high costs of atypical antipsychotic use- $13
billion in 2007 alone- caused the OIG to call for major changes in the use of these medications in
the elderly with a diagnosis of dementia in nursing homes.
Five-Star Rating
In 2008, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) developed and
implemented the Five-Star Quality Ratings, publicly available on Nursing Home Compare
(www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/). The Five-Star rating system was created to assist
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consumers in assessing and selecting nursing homes based on a variety of factors, including
inspection results, staffing, and quality indicators (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
2019).
Figure 3. Conceptual Model, Overall Five-Star Rating Composition
Health
Inspections
-Recertification
-Complaint

Staffing
-RN

Quality
Measures
-Short-stay
-Long-stay
-Overall

-Total Nursing: RN,
LPN, Nurse Aide

Overall
Five-Star
Rating
Health Inspections. Results of the last three health inspection surveys are compiled to
develop a five-star rating for this component. Each nursing home is given a rating of one to five
stars in comparison to other nursing homes in their State. A number of points are assigned to
each deficiency received, with a greater number of points assigned to deficiencies of higher
scope and severity (Table 5).
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Table 2. Scope and Severity, Health Inspection Deficiencies

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, October 2019, p. 3

The nursing homes with the lowest number of points are granted a five-star rating as a top
10% performer within their State. The middle performers (seventy percent of the homes in the
State) are assigned two, three, or four stars. The bottom 20%, considered low performers, are
given a one-star rating. The relative weight of the prior three recertification and complaint
surveys are detailed in Table 6.
Table 3. Five-Star Health Inspection Composition

Recertification
Most Recent
Second Most Recent
Third Most Recent

Weight Contribution to
Five-Star Health
Inspection Rating
Complaint
50%
12 months or less
33.3%
13-24 months
16.7%
25-36 months

Weight Contribution
to Five-Star Health
Inspection Rating
50%
33.3%
16.7%

The health inspection component of the overall five-star rating is updated monthly to
account for recent recertification, complaint, and follow-up surveys.
Staffing. The staffing component of the five-star rating is based on total nursing,
including Registered Nurses (RN), Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs), and Nurse Aides (NAs)
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and RN staffing. Staffing numbers are submitted by providers electronically on a quarterly basis
to CMS via the Payroll-Based Journal (PBJ) (CMS, 2019). Hours per resident day are calculated
and adjusted for resident acuity based on MDS data. The staffing component of the five-star
rating is updated quarterly.
Quality Measures. The quality measure component of the five-star rating is updated
quarterly based on fifteen quality measures derived from the MDS or Medicare claims-based
data (CMS, 2019). Scores are calculated for long-stay, short-stay, and overall quality measures
(Table 4). The overall quality measure score is utilized in the overall five-star facility rating.
Nursing homes are given points for each quality measure (Tables 7, 8), with a higher score
representing higher quality. Four quarters of data are utilized to develop the quality measure
score to reduce variation and bias (CMS, 2019).
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Table 4. Five-Star Quality Measures: Type, MDS versus Claims Based, and Points
Short-Stay or
Long-Stay

MDS or
Claims Based

Maximum
Number of
Points

Long-Stay

MDS

150

Percent of residents whose ability to move
independently worsened

Long-Stay

MDS

150

Percent of high-risk residents with
pressure ulcers

Long-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of residents who have/had a
catheter inserted and left in their bladder

Long-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of long-stay residents who report
moderate to severe pain**

Long-Stay

MDS

**

Percent of residents with a urinary tract
infection

Long-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of residents experiencing one or
more falls with major injury

Long-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of residents who received an
antipsychotic medication

Long-Stay

MDS

150

Number of hospitalizations per 1,000
long-stay resident days
Number of outpatient emergency
department (ED) visits per 1,000 longstay resident days

Long-Stay

Claims

150

Long-Stay

Claims

150

Percent of residents who made
improvement in function

Short-Stay

MDS

150

Percent of SNF residents with pressure
ulcers that are new or worsened

Short-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of residents who newly received
an antipsychotic medication

Short-Stay

MDS

100

Percent of short-stay residents who report
moderate to severe pain**
Percent of short-stay residents who were
re-hospitalized after a nursing home
admission
Percent of short-stay residents who have
had an outpatient emergency department
(ED) visit

Short-Stay

MDS

**

Short-Stay

Claims

150

Short-Stay

Claims

150

Quality Measure
Percent of residents whose need for help
with activities of daily living has
increased

Rate of successful return to home and
Short-Stay
Claims
150
community from a SNF
**In October 2019, CMS removed the quality measures for percentage of long- and short-stay residents reporting moderate to
severe pain. This change was made due to speculation nursing homes with higher rates of pain may seek intervention with
opioids (CMS, 2019), a conflict of interest with the current opioid crisis in the United States. These measures have been in place
since 2010 and have been a meaningful measure of quality of care in several studies (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Dulal, 2018;
Grabowski et al, 2008; Xu et al, 2016). With data available through 2019, the pain quality measure for long-stay residents will
be utilized in this study.
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Table 5. Overall Quality Measure Rating Categories

Points
Range

1-Star

2-Stars

3-Stars

4-Stars

5-Stars

299-943

9441132

11331298

12991474

14752300

Overall Rating. The CMS considers health inspection ratings to be most important in
providing an overall five-star rating for each nursing home. Overall rating begins with health
inspection star rating, with one star added for staffing rating of four to five or subtracted for
staffing rating of one. One star is then added for a quality measure rating of five or subtracted
for a rating of one.
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CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY

This study is a retrospective program evaluation using data from the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Nursing Home Compare to compare nursing home
quality measures pre- and post-implementation of Phase I of the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities. Nursing Home Compare data
are collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) Nursing Home Compare MDS
Quality Measures (QMs). This data is derived from nursing home resident’s Minimum Data Set
(MDS), transmitted to CMS by Medicare and Medicaid certified facilities. The files are
available to the public for all nursing home-based skilled nursing facilities and exclude critical
access hospital (CAH) swing beds. QMs are available on a national level and provide
information about the quality of care provided in SNFs/ NFs (Castle & Ferguson, 2010).
The four quality measures selected for this study include the percentage of short-stay
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who
self-report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically
restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who got an antipsychotic medication were
selected for several reasons. These QMs are evidenced-based measures of quality of care (Ward,
2016) and exist as publicly reported quality measures pre- and post-implementation of the Phase
I RoP. Additionally, all have been utilized as indicators of quality of care in SNFs/NFs in prior
studies (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Grabowski et al, 2008; Kapp, 2000; Kumar, Norton &
Encinosa, 2006; Wade, 2016) and in quality initiatives such as Advancing Excellence and the
National Nursing Home Quality Improvement Campaign (http://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/).
According to Castle & Ferguson (2010), the QMs selected for this study are “quality indicators
used in prominent quality initiatives” (p. 433). The QMs have been gathered and publicly
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reported by CMS since 2008; three of the four QMs in this study have been publicly reported
since 2010 (see Table 3).
Quality measures provide information on structural, process, and outcome measures in
nursing homes. For the purposes of this study, process and outcome measures are used to
determine the effect of the RoP Phase I on quality in nursing homes. The process measures
indicate what the SNF/ NF is doing to provide care and services to residents. Outcomes
measures indicate the effectiveness of processes and systems.

Figure 4. Process and
Process
Measures
of Quality

Use of
physical
restraints

Antipsychotic
use

Outcome
Measures
of Quality

Outcome Measures
Residents
with moderate
to severe pain

Residents
with pressure
sores

Research Design
A quantitative approach to test the four study hypotheses was conducted. This approach
was used based on the quantitative nature of the data used in the study, and the lack of prior
statistical analysis regarding the impact of regulatory stringency on quality measures in SNFs/
NFs. The quality measures included in this study have been used as measures of quality in prior
studies, with three of the four- pressure ulcers, restraints, and pain- endorsed by the National
Quality Forum (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019).
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Sample Selection
The datasets from January to December 2015 and January to December 2017 were
downloaded from https://data.medicare.gov/data/nursing-home-compare. SNFs/ NFs with
missing data were excluded, as well as those who operate as part of a hospital. The dataset was
cleaned to eliminate SNFs/ NFs with missing data and to solely include the quality measure
variables of interest to the study (Figure 5). The final sample size for the study included 14,210
Medicare and/ or Medicare certified skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs) in
the United States. SNFs/ NFs residing in a hospital were excluded due to the distinct differences
in comparison with non-hospital-based facilities.
The measure score was filtered by inclusion criteria, comprised of ownership, bed
certification, location (state), and zip code. These variables were included due to the evidencebase supporting the influence of ownership, number of beds per facility, and local markets on
quality of care in SNFs/ NFs (Kapp, 2000). Data were linked by provider number.
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Figure 5. Data Exclusion and Synthesis Process
Data Exclusion and Synthesis Process
Nursing Home
Compare Data
Sets 2015

2015 Provider
Information
Data Set
n= 15,774
Providers

Nursing Home
Compare Data
Sets 2017

2017 Provider
Information Data
Set n=15,772
Providers

2015 Five-Star
Quality Measures
Data Set
n= 15,194

Providers

Removed from
Study n=728

Removed from
Study n=828

Yes

2017 Five-Star
Quality Measures
Data Set n=15,490
Providers

Yes

Does the
Provider
reside in a
Hospital?

Does the
provider
reside in a
hospital?

No
2015 Provider
Information Data
Set n=15,033

Merge data set
where provider
numbers match

No
2015 Provider
Information
Data Set
n=14,946

Merge data sets
where Provider
Numbers
Match

Removed
from Study
n-230

Providers
Removed from
Study n=477
N=14,803
Providers in
Study

N=14,269
Providers in
Study
Merge data sets
where provider
numbers match

Removed
from Study
n=259

N=14,210
Providers in
Study
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Table 6. Covariates and Definitions
Covariate

Definition

Number of certified
beds
For profit- Corporation
For profit- Individual
For profit- Limited
liability
For profit- Partnership
Government- City
Government- City/
County
Government- County
Government- Federal
Government- Hospital
Government- State
Non profit- Church
related
Non profit- Corporate
Ownership Non profit- Other
Bed Cert

Integer

Label

2-character postal
abbreviation

Provider State
State
Zip

Type

Provider Zip Code

5-digit zip code

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.

Instrumentation
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used to analyze and
compare data by quarter for January to December 2015 (pre-implementation) and January to
December 2017 (post-implementation) of the 2016 Medicare RoP Phase I.
Data Set Description
Publicly available archival data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) Nursing Home Compare (https://data.medicare.gov/data/nursing-home-compare) for 14,
210 nursing homes in the United States were utilized for this study. The data is derived from the
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Minimum Data Set (MDS), completed quarterly for all SNF/ NF residents. The MDS is
completed by professional staff in the SNF/ NF and transmitted to CMS, where it is added to a
national database (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019).
Table 7. Quality Measures: Definition, Numerator, and Denominator
Quality Measure

Definition

Numerator

Denominator

Exclusions

Percentage of Short-Stay
residents with pressure
ulcers that are new or
worsened

% short-stay residents with
new or worsened pressure
ulcers stage II-IV

Short-stay residents with
new or worsening stage IIIV pressure ulcer(s) in past
quarter)

All residents with
assessments in
past quarter

Data from look-back
unavailable

Percentage of Long-Stay
residents who report
moderate to severe pain

% long-stay residents who
report at consistent moderate
to severe pain in the past 5
days OR one episode of
severe pain

Long-stay residents who
report: 1)at least one episode
of daily moderate/ severe
pain and/ or 2) severe pain of
any frequency

All long-stay
residents with
assessments in
past quarter

Residents without
numeric pain
indicators and/ or
those not assessed

Percentage of Long-Stay
residents who were
physically restrained

% long-stay residents with
daily physically restraint

Long-stay residents with
daily trunk or limb restraints
or prevention of rising from
bed or chair

All residents with
assessments in
past quarter

Areas of MDS
Section P that are not
assessed (trunk, limb
restraints, chair
prevents rising)

Percentage of Long-Stay
residents who received an
antipsychotic medication

% of long-stay residents who
received antipsychotic in the
quarter (if MDS completed
in quarter)

Long-stay residents who
received antipsychotic
medication during
assessment

All residents with
assessments in
past quarter

Residents with
diagnosis of
Schizophrenia,
Tourette's Syndrome,
Huntingtons Disease

Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2019)

Variables
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the changes that occurred to the selected
quality measures (Table 8). These include four quality measures: percentage of short-stay
residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, percentage of long-stay residents who
report moderate to severe pain, percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained,
and percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication. The quality
measures are numerical in nature and are further defined in Table 9. The study also provides
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descriptive statistics summarizing the number of certified beds in the nursing home, ownership
type, and location.
Table 8. Variables

Variables

Percentage of ShortStay residents with
pressure ulcers that
are new or worsened

Percentage of LongStay residents who
report moderate to
severe pain

Percentage of
Long-Stay
residents who
were physically
restrained

Percentage of
Long-Stay
residents who
received an
antipsychotic
medication

Covariates

Number of Certified
Beds

Ownership

State

Zip Code

Table 9. Quality Measures: Implementation, Definition, Type

Short Stay

Long Stay

Quality Measure
Percent of Residents
with Pressure Ulcers
that are New or
Worsened

Date
Implemented

Definition

Type of
Data

10/1/2010

% short-stay residents with
new or worsened pressure
ulcers stage II-IV

Numerical

Percent of residents
who self-report
moderate to severe
pain

10/1/2010

% long-stay residents who
report at least one episode of
moderate to severe pain in the
past 5 days

Numerical

Percent of Residents
who were Physically
Restrained

10/1/2010

% long-stay residents with
daily physically restraint

Numerical

4/1/2012

% of long-stay residents who
received antipsychotic in the
quarter (if MDS completed in
quarter)

Numerical

Percent of Residents
who Received an
Antipsychotic
Medication

Research Question and Research Hypotheses
How do CMS quality measures (QMs) compare pre- and post-implementation of Phase I
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of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities?
H1. The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H2. The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will
decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H3. The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline postimplementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to identify trends pre- and post-implementation of the
Requirements of Participation Phase I. Univariate analysis was conducted separately for each of
the four quality measures to determine the mean and standard deviation. Normally continuous
variables were tested using a t-test. Non-normally distributed continuous data were tested
utilizing nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon), and categorical data were compared using a Chi-square
test. A bivariate analysis was conducted for each of the 4 quality measures, comparing means by
quarter from prior to implementation of RoP (2015) and post implementation of RoP (2017).
The mean and standard deviation for each of the quality measures are reported in Table 12.
Logistic models were used to examine effect of contextual geographic measures as
needed. Logistic modeling of key measurements was conducted to determine the influence of
State (location) and ownership type for each facility. Models were pared down to show variable
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factors with significant p values. States with significance were placed in the comparison group,
while the remaining states were arranged to create the reference group (Table 10).
Table 10. Reference and Comparison Groups: Logistic Model
States in Reference
Group
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
DC
GA
HI
IN
KS
MD
MI
MN
MT
NC

States in Comparison
Group

ND
NH
NM
NV
PA
PR
RI
SC
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WV
WY

CT
DE
FL
IA
ID
IL
KY
LA
MA
ME
MO
MS
NE
NJ

NY
OH
OK
OR
SD
TN
WI

Limitations
There are limitations to the use of quality measures (QMs) as quality of care metric.
QMs are derived from minimum data set (MDS) information. The MDS is completed by facility
staff, and despite training, there is room for subjectivity or errors in data entry (Castle &
Ferguson, 2010). Interpretation of the questions and approaches to gathering data are potentially
variable. To address this issue, CMS implemented MDS focused surveys as means to
substantiate the accuracy of MDS coding in SNFs/ NFs.
Protection of Human Subjects
The study did not require IRB approval as there were no human subjects involved and the
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data for the study was de-identified and publicly available.
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CHAPTER IV RESULTS
Results/Findings

This retrospective study using data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) Nursing Home Compare was conducted to determine the effects of the Medicare and
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) Phase I for Long-Term Care Facilities on four
quality measures. The publicly available dataset was revised to exclude critical access hospital
(CAH) swing beds and facilities with missing data. Approximately 800 facilities did not report
quality measure data in either 2015 or 2017, potentially due to closure, de-certification, or new
certification after 2015. The final dataset included 14,210 Medicare and/or Medicaid certified
Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs)/ Nursing Facilities (NFs) of the 15,600 in the United States, or
ninety-one percent of facilities (Harris-Kojetin et al, 2019). The Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used to analyze and compare data.
On average, there are 110.2 certified beds (SD 58.7) (Table 10). The mean number of
beds was the same (110.2) in both 2015 and 2017, with a .4 decrease in standard deviation from
2015 (58.7) to 2017 (58.3). The majority of SNFs/ NFs were owned by a for-profit corporation
(9,235 or 65%), for-profit partnership (753 or 5.3%), or county government (400 or 2.8%).
Figure 6 provides information regarding the percentage of for-profit facilities by state (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2017).
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics: Number of Certified Beds and Ownership Type
Organizational Characteristics
Number of Certified Beds -Mean (std)
Ownership Type n(%)
For profit- Corporation
For profit- Individual
For profit- Limited Liability
For profit- Partnership
Government- City
Government- City/ County
Government- County
Government- Federal
Government- Hospital
Government- State
Non profit- Church related
Non profit- Corporation
Non profit- other

2015
110.2 (58.7)
14210 (100)
9235 (65)
486 (3.4)
51 (.4)
754 (5.3)
57 (.4)
80 (.6)
400 (2.8)
12 (.1)
110 (.8)
116 (.8)
542 (3.8)
2204 (15.5)
163 (1.1)
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2017
110.2 (58.3)

Figure 6.

Descriptive statistics were utilized to calculate the number and percentage of SNFs/NFs
in each State (Table 11). Of the top five States with the highest number of SNFs/NFs in the
U.S., Texas (1140, 8%) and California (1071, 7.5%), comprise almost 16%. Ohio (906, 6.4%),
Illinois (688, 4.8%) and Florida (688, 4.7%) round out five States with the highest number of
facilities.

50

Table 12. Number and Percentage of SNFs/ NFs by State
State
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
Total

Number of Facilities
4.0
213.0
217.0
138.0
1071.0
203.0
217.0
13.0
44.0
668.0
308.0
31.0
378.0
63.0
688.0
516.0
268.0
256.0
265.0
387.0
217.0
92.0
402.0
309.0
480.0
179.0
54.0
403.0
62.0
174.0
69.0
339.0
66.0
44.0
556.0
906.0
281.0
132.0
660.0
2.0
81.0
173.0
89.0
291.0
1140.0
91.0
264.0
34.0
203.0
343.0
103.0
23.0
14210.0

Percent of Total SNFs/ NFs(U.S)
0.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
7.5
1.4
1.5
0.1
0.3
4.7
2.2
0.2
2.7
0.4
4.8
3.6
1.9
1.8
1.9
2.7
1.5
0.6
2.8
2.2
3.4
1.3
0.4
2.8
0.4
1.2
0.5
2.4
0.5
0.3
3.9
6.4
2.0
0.9
4.6
0.0
0.6
1.2
0.6
2.0
8.0
0.6
1.9
0.2
1.4
2.4
0.7
0.2
100.0
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Non-parametric analysis was conducted using Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests to determine if
there was a statistically significant difference in quality measures scores pre-implementation
(2015) and post-implementation (2017) of the Requirements of Participation (RoP) (Table 12).
This approach was used to compare the means for each quality measure by quarter and year.
Table 13. Mean and Standard Deviation by Quarter and Year

Metric
Percentage of longstay residents who
received an
antipsychotic
medication
Percentage of longstay residents who
self-report moderate to
severe pain
Percentage of longstay residents who
were physically
restrained
Percentage of shortstay residents with
pressure ulcers that are
new or worsened

2015- 2017Q1
Q1
Mean Mean
(SD) (SD)

pvalue

2015- 2017Q2
Q2
Mean Mean
(SD) (SD)

pvalue

2015- 2017Q3
Q3
Mean Mean
(SD) (SD)

pvalue

2015- 2017Q4
Q4
Mean Mean
(SD) (SD)

pvalue

18.4
(10.2)

15.6
(9.9)

<.0001

17.6
(9.9)

15.4
(9.9)

<.0001

17.1
(9.8)

15.3
(9.8)

<.0001

16.8
(9.6)

15
(9.5)

<.0001

6.6
(6.3)

5.4
(5.9)

<.0001

8.4
(7.6)

5.1
(5.7)

<.0001

8.1
(7.4)

5.0
(5.6)

<.0001

7.5
(7.0)

5.7
(6.4)

<.0001

1.0
(2.7)

0.4
(2.0)

<.0001

0.9
(2.6)

0.4
(2.0)

<.0001

0.8
(2.7)

0.4
(2.0)

<.0001

0.8
(2.5)

0.4
(2.0)

<.0001

0.8
(1.4)

0.8
(1.4)

0.96

1.2
(1.8)

0.8
(1.3)

<.0001

1.1
(1.7)

0.7
(1.2)

<.0001

1.1
(1.6)

0.8
(1.4)

<.0001

H1. The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
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Figure 7. Percentage of Short-Stay Residents with Pressure Ulcers that are New or
Worsened: Mean and Standard Deviation

The mean percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or
worsened was unchanged when comparing quarter 1 in 2015 and quarter 1 2017 (p=0.96). When
comparing means for 2015 (range of 0.8 to 1.2) and 2017 (0.7 to 0.8) for quarters two, three, and
four, all showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001). Standard deviations (SD) reflect
large variations in means for each quarter and year. In 2015, standard deviation ranged from 1.4
to 1.8. In 2017, the range was 1.2 to 1.4. The comparison of means shows a statistically
significant decrease in the percentage of short- stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or
worsened when comparing quarters two, three, and four in 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the
null hypothesis (Figure 7).
H2. The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
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Figure 8. Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who Reported Moderate to Severe Pain:
Mean and Standard Deviation

The mean percentage and standard deviation showed a statistically significant decline
quarters one through four in 2017 in comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001). When comparing means
for 2015 (range of 6.6 to 8.4) and 2017 (range of 5.0 to 5.7) for quarters two, three, and four, all
showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001). Standard deviations (SD) reflect large
variations in means for each quarter and year. In 2015, the standard deviation ranged from 6.3 to
7.6. In 2017, the range was 5.6 to 6.4. The comparison of means and standard deviation reflect
a statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay residents who reported moderate
to severe pain when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the null hypothesis (Figure 8).
H3. The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline
post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
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Figure 9. Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who were Physically Restrained: Mean and
Standard Deviation

The mean percentage and standard deviation of long-stay residents who were physically
restrained showed a statistically significant decline quarters one through four in 2017 in
comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001). When comparing means for 2015 (range of 0.8- 1.0) and 2017
(0.4) for quarters two, three, and four, all showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001).
Standard deviations (SD) reflect large variations in each quarter of 2015 with a range of 2.5 to
2.7 in 2015. In 2017, the SD was consistent at 2.0. and a range of 2.0. The comparison of means
and standard deviation reflect a statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay
residents who were physically restrained when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the
null hypothesis (Figure 9).
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
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Figure 10. Percentage of Long-Stay Residents who Received an Antipsychotic
Medication: Mean and Standard Deviation

The mean percentage and standard deviation of long-stay residents who received an
antipsychotic medication showed a statistically significant decline quarters one through four in
2017 in comparison to 2015 (p=<.0001). The mean percentage and standard deviation showed a
statistically significant decline quarters one through four in 2017 in comparison to 2015
(p=<.0001). When comparing means for 2015 (range of 16.8 to 18.4) and 2017 (range of 15 to
15.6) all quarters showed a statistically significant decline (p=<.0001). Standard deviations (SD)
reflect large variations in means for each quarter and year, with a range of 9.6 to 10.2 in 2015
and a range of 9.5 to 9.9 in 2017. The comparison of means and standard deviation reflect a
statistically significant decline in the percentage of long-stay residents who received an
antipsychotic medication when comparing 2015 and 2017, thereby accepting the null hypothesis
(Figure 10).
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Table 14. Odds Ratio results for Comparison Quarter 4 2015-2017
*States are compared to reference group (Table 10); Ownership is compared to For-Profit
Parameter:
Odds Ratio
(pvalue)

% of long-stay residents % of long-stay residents
% of long-stay
% of short-stay residents
who received an
who self-report
residents who were with pressure ulcers that
antipsychotic medication moderate to severe pain physically restrained
are new or worsened

CT

1.034 (0.1797)

1.451 (0.0029)

2.208 (0.0003)

1.299 (0.2891)

DE

0.383 (0.0114)

1.471 (0.1611)

1.205 (0.5845)

1.166 (0.8533)

FL

1.174 (0.0002)

1.298 (0.0003)

2.478 (<.0001)

1.342 (0.0307)

IA

0.815 (0.6106)

0.682 (0.0043)

0.615 (0.1778)

1.011 (0.6598)

ID

0.367 (0.0023)

0.653 (0.205)

0.309 (0.0181)

0.736 (0.3088)

IL

0.782 (0.2467)

1.16 (0.0165)

1.009 (0.1428)

0.998 (0.3884)

KY

1.234 (0.0049)

1.464 (0.0008)

1.829 (<.0001)

1.016 (0.6599)

LA

1.363 (0.0003)

1.891 (<.0001)

2.379 (<.0001)

0.831 (0.0861)

MA

0.887 (0.7735)

1.326 (0.0018)

1.851 (<.0001)

1.325 (0.1101)

ME

0.529 (0.0215)

0.413 (0.0008)

0.099 (0.0004)

1.189 (0.7225)

MO

0.721 (0.0652)

0.715 (0.0061)

0.56 (0.0404)

1.154 (0.6453)

MS

0.967 (0.4337)

1.321 (0.0299)

1.646 (0.003)

0.81 (0.1302)

NE

0.764 (0.4349)

0.444 (<.0001)

0.171 (<.0001)

0.791 (0.1457)

NJ

1.616 (<.0001)

1.315 (0.0068)

1.806 (<.0001)

1.377 (0.0703)

NY

2.073 (<.0001)

1.793 (<.0001)

1.847 (<.0001)

1.366 (0.026)

OH

1.343 (<.0001)

1.145 (0.011)

1.272 (0.0025)

1.255 (0.1224)

OK

0.604 (0.0042)

0.912 (0.804)

0.437 (0.0086)

0.845 (0.0992)

OR

0.618 (0.091)

0.294 (<.0001)

0.046 (<.0001)

1.21 (0.6043)

SD

0.514 (0.0163)

0.666 (0.1067)

1.208 (0.361)

1.41 (0.4751)

TN

1.282 (0.0014)

0.825 (0.317)

1.964 (<.0001)

1.085 (0.9899)

WI

0.727 (0.1316)

0.725 (0.0289)

0.396 (0.0021)

1.154 (0.6728)

Non profit

0.926 (0.4663)

1.022 (0.1261)

0.815 (0.7471)

0.923 (0.7207)

Government

0.766 (<.0001)

0.813 (0.0002)

0.61 (<.0001)

0.916 (0.491)
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Logistic modeling of key measurements indicates the influence of State (location) and
ownership type for each facility. Models were pared down to show variable factors with
significant p values. States with significance were placed in the comparison group, while the
remaining states were arranged to create the reference group. In Connecticut, short-stay patients
with pressure ulcers observed a 30% increase in reduction of key measurements but the findings
were not significant (OR=1.299, p=0.2891) (Table 13). Long-stay physically restrained residents
saw a 121% (2.2-fold) increase in reduction of key measurements and the findings were
significant (OR=2.208, p=0.0003).
Of the twenty-one states in the comparison group, eleven experienced an increase in the
odds of reduction in percentage quality measures included in the study. Five States observed
increases in reduction of long-stay antipsychotic use with statistical significance. Florida had a
17% increase in the reduction of long-stay antipsychotics (p=0.0002), Louisiana a 36% increase
in reduction (p=0.0003), New Jersey 62% increase in reduction (p=0.0001), New York 107%
(2.1 fold) increase in reduction (p=0.0001), and Ohio a 34% increase in reduction (p=0.0001).
Other States had an increase in the reduction of antipsychotic use, including Kentucky (23%) and
Tennessee (28%), but neither were significant (p=0.0049 and 0.0014 respectively).
Four states observed increases in reduction of long-stay moderate to severe pain with
significant findings. Florida had a 30% increase in the reduction of long-stay moderate to severe
pain (p=0.0003), Louisiana 89% (p=0.0001), New York 79% (p=0.0001), and Oregon 29%
(p=0.0001).
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Seven States, in addition to Connecticut, observed increases in the reduction of long-stay
physical restraints with significant findings. Florida had a 148% (2.4 fold) increase in the
reduction of physical restraints (p=0.0001), Kentucky 83% (p=0.0001), Louisiana 138% (2.4
fold, p=0.0001), Massachusetts 85% (p=0.0001), New Jersey 81% (p=0.0001), New York 85%
(p=0.0001), and Tennessee 96% (p=0.0001). None of the States observed an increase in the
reduction of new or worsened short-stay pressure ulcers with significance.
Table 15 provides data regarding states in the comparison group and higher/ lower odds
ratios post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation for the four quality measures
included in the study; percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic
medication, percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain, long-stay
residents who were physically restrained, and short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are
new or worsened.
Table 15. Quality Measure Ratings and Odds Ratios by U.S. Region

West
Northeast
Midwest
South

Average Quality
Measure StarRating and
Standard
Deviation*

Number of
States in
Comparison
Group

Number
of States
with
higher
OR

Number of
States
with lower
OR

3.81 (1.31)
3.58 (1.33)
3.39 (1.38)
3.19 (1.39)

1
5
8
7

0
4
2
5

1
1
6
2

*Yuan et al (2018).
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Logistic modeling of ownership observed significant findings in comparing for-profit,
non profit, and government owned SNFs/ NFs. Using for-profit facilities as the reference group,
government owned facilities were 23% less likely than for-profit facilities to observe a decrease
in the reduction of long-stay antipsychotic use (p=0.0001), 19% less likely to observe a decrease
in long-stay moderate to severe pain (p=0.0002), and 39% less likely to observe a decrease in
percentage of long-stay physical restraints (p=0.0001). Government owned facilities were 7%
less likely to observe a decrease in the percentage of short-stay pressure ulcers, though this was
not statistically significant (p=0.491). Non profit facilities were 7% less likely than for-profit
facilities to experience a decrease in antipsychotic use, though not statistically significant
(p=0.4663). Non profit facilities were 18% less likely to experience a reduction in the
percentage of physical restraints (p=0.7471) and 8% less likely to observe a reduction in shortstay pressure ulcers (p=0.7207), though neither were statistically significant. Non profit facilities
had a 2% increase in the likelihood of reduction in the percentage of long-stay moderate to
severe pain, but the findings were not significant (p=0.1261).

60

CHAPTER V DISCUSSION

Long-term care has a lengthy history of stringent regulations developed in response to
highly publicized poor outcomes (Eskildsen & Price, 2009). Phase I of the Medicare and
Medicaid Requirements of Participation (RoP) for Long-Term Care Facilities went into effect on
November 27, 2016. According to Unroe, Ouslander, and Saliba (2017), the cost of
implementing these rules is estimated at approximately $62,900 for the first year, and $55,000
per year thereafter. However, it is not known if these costly new rules have any impact on quality
measures.
The purpose of this research project was to gain understanding of the impact of the 2016
RoP (Phase I) on quality measures in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs).
Results will enable providers to gain a better understanding of the impact of the RoP on four
SNF/NF quality measures and provide policymakers with information regarding the impact of
the RoP. This chapter will discuss major findings of the study, relationship to literature,
interpretation of results, recommendations for future research, study limitations, and a final
summary.
Research Question and Hypotheses
How do CMS quality measures (QMs) compare pre- and post-implementation of Phase I of
the Medicare and Medicaid Programs Reform of the Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities?
H1. The percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened
will decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H2. The percentage of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain will
decline post- implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
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H3. The percentage of long-stay residents who were physically restrained will decline postimplementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
H4. The percentage of long-stay residents who received an antipsychotic medication will
decline post-implementation of the Phase I Requirements of Participation.
The results of the study indicate three major findings, including 1) statistically significant
reduction post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation (RoP) in the mean
percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new or worsened, the percentage
of long-stay residents who self-report moderate to severe pain, the percentage of long-stay
residents who were physically restrained, and the percentage of long-stay residents who received
an antipsychotic medication; 2) the influence of ownership; and 3) the influence of location
(State).
Interpretation of the Results
The results of the study indicate statistically significant decreases in the mean percentage
of each quality measure for fifteen of the sixteen quarter comparisons, 2015 to 2017. Logistic
models indicate the influence of ownership type (for-profit, non profit, and governments) and
location (State) in predicting the odds of reduction in each quality measure variable percentage in
2017 from 2015.
Comparison of Means Pre- and Post-implementation of the Requirements of Participation
Reductions in the mean percentage of short-stay residents with pressure ulcers that are new
or worsened were observed post-implementation of the RoP (p=.0001) for three of the four
comparisons. While quarter one did not have a significant change in mean percentage when
comparing 2015 and 2017 (p=0.96), quarters two through four indicate a significant decline in
mean percentages post-implementation of the RoP.
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Reductions in the percentage of long-stay residents with antipsychotic use, physical
restraints, and moderate to severe pain were observed for all quarters post-implementation of the
RoP (p=.0001).
There are several factors aside from the implementation of the RoP that may have
impacted the improvements in quality measure outcomes when comparing 2015 and 2017. The
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) was introduced by CMS in 2010 to reduce
preventable readmissions to the hospital within 30 days of discharge (Zuckerman, Sheingold,
Orav, Ruhter & Epstien, 2016). The HRRP is part of the CMS value-based care initiative, which
includes financial penalties to hospitals who do not meet the risk-adjusted national averages for
readmissions (CMS, n.d.; McIlvennen et al, 2015). The Protecting Medicare Act of 2014
(PAMA) announced penalties to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) of up to 2% for Medicare FeeFor-Service patients returning to the hospital within 30 days of discharge, effective in 2018
(CMS, n.d.). These programs have provided increased incentives to SNFs to improve quality
outcomes. Additionally, the growth of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and their
requirements of participation (minimum of 3-star rating, staffing levels, utilization and numbers
of physician extenders) have caused SNFs to improve their performance to stay competitive and
ensure they are selected as preferred providers (Chang et al, 2019).
Influence of Ownership
The influence of ownership on nursing home quality has been well-studied (Hillmer,
Wodchis, Gill, Anderson & Rochon, 2005; Qi, Luke, Crecelius & Maddox, 2019; Yuan, Louis,
Cabral, Schneider, Ryan & Kazis, 2018). The outcomes of this study indicate the influence of
ownership status on reductions in the percentage of antipsychotic use, physical restraints,
moderate to severe pain, and pressure ulcers (quality measures) in nursing homes. Non profit
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and government owned facilities had a lower likelihood of reduction in quality measure
percentages in comparison to for-profit SNFs/NFs. Prior studies indicate higher quality in non
profit versus for-profit facilities (Qi et al, 2019; Yuan et al, 2018). A study by Yuan et al (2018)
indicates quality measures star rating of 3.54 (SD 1.33) in non profit facilities, 3.40 (1.38) in forprofit, and 3.15 (1.48) for government owned facilities. Hillmer et al (2005) conducted a
systematic review of studies researching the correlation between ownership and quality in
nursing facilities. While most of the studies indicated non profit facilities experiencing better
quality processes and outcomes, a few reported the opposite or no differences. Additional
considerations, such as acuity or case-mix and payer-mix may have an impact when considering
ownership and quality measure outcomes.
Influence of State/ Location
Robust literature exists regarding the influence of state (location) on SNF/ NF quality
measure outcomes. As mentioned in Chapter II, Mukamel et al (2011) references the variances in
quality measures amongst states due to the acuity of nursing home residents and the impact on
the measurement of quality and regulatory compliance. Yuan et al (2018) report average quality
measure star ratings of 3.58 (SD 1.33) in the Northeast, 3.39 (1.38) in the Midwest, 3.19 (1.39)
in the South, and 3.81 (1.31) in the West. Variances amongst states were evident for the four
quality measures included in this study, as reported in Table 14.
As described in the literature, there are several factors influencing quality measure outcomes.
Studies have found that pressure ulcers reflect staffing levels and competency of staff, both
impacted by payer-mix and state Medicaid funding (Blankart, Foster & Mor, 2019; Grabowski et
al, 2008; Gruneir & Mor, 2008). Grabowski et al (2008) found a direct relationship between
quality of care amongst payer sources, indicated stronger quality indicators for higher payer
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sources such as Medicare and private funding, and lower indicators of quality for Medicaid.
Levenson (2010) underscores the importance of considering acuity, needs, and preferences of the
resident in setting reimbursement.
Additional factors having an impact on the variances in quality measure outcomes between
states include minimum staffing requirements (Bowblis, 2015), regulatory stringency at the state
and local levels, and levels of competition and transparency (Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Mukamel
et al, 2012). Lastly, demographic factors, such as income and education levels, unemployment
rates, and poverty levels have proven to be a factor in quality measure differences amongst states
(Yuan et al, 2018).
Study Limitations
While this study adds important and timely information to the existing knowledge base
surrounding the effects of regulatory stringency on quality measures in Skilled Nursing Facilities
(SNFs)/ Nursing Facilities (NFs), there are several limitations to be considered. Key study
limitations include 1) the use of Minimum Data Set (MDS) Data; 2) Patient Characteristics and
Demographic Information; 3) External and Internal Factors.
Use of Minimum Data Set (MDS)
Given the limited sources of data pertaining to nursing homes, this study utilized Nursing
Home Compare Minimum Data Set (MDS) collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services to conduct a retrospective program evaluation. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) was
introduced in 1991, requiring skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)/ nursing facilities (NFs) to assess
resident’s health status and capabilities in performing activities of daily living (ADLs) (Castle &
Ferguson, 2010). The MDS information is also used to determine reimbursement, focus of
survey inspections, and as a publicly reported measure of quality in nursing homes (Rahman &
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Applebaum, 2009). While the reliability and validity of earlier versions of the MDS was
disputed, the implementation of MDS 3.0 in October 2010 brought greater validity and interrater reliability by standardizing the tool and providing means to engage the resident in the
assessment process.
The aspects and consequences of coding the MDS are abundant and can provide
motivation to manipulate responses to increase reimbursement, improve survey outcomes, and/or
improve public perception of the facilities performance. Reliability and validity depend on
several factors, including the experience and training of the licensed nurse(s) completing the
MDS, and the engagement of the resident and interdisciplinary team in the process (Saliba &
Buchanan, 2012). A report by the Government Accountability Office (2018) indicated
inaccuracies in self-reported data, including short-stay pressure ulcers, long-stay antipsychotic
use, physical restraints, and moderate to severe pain. While a reduction in each of these
measures was observed between 2011 and 2014, the report indicated it could not attribute the
improvements to quality versus difficult to determine whether observed trends reflect actual
changes in quality, data issues, or both. The report indicates a lack of systematic approach to
monitor the accuracy of the data. While data is validated by surveyors during compliance and
regulatory visits, there is potential for inaccuracy as only a small selection of reviews are
conducted.
Additional limitations to the use of the MDS data included the inability to obtain data by
calendar year hence the need to compare quarter to quarter 2015 and 2017 for each of the four
quality measures. The datasets were difficult to employ, and data was non-normally distributed
with wide variances. Due to these challenges, logistic modeling was confined to one quarter
(quarter four) 2015 and 2017.
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Patient Characteristics and Demographic Factors
This study did not incorporate several demographics such as age, acuity, and payer mix,
all of which have been identified as having an impact on facility quality measures through a
variety of evidenced-based studies (Change et al, 2016; Hillmer et al, 2005; Mays et al, 2018).
The literature indicates the effects of payer mix on quality improvement and outcomes in SNFs/
NFs (Bowblis, 2015; Levenson, 2010). The inability to include patient characteristics and
demographic factors may present limitations to the generalizability of the results and may have
influenced the results of the study. Controlling for these factors and comparing data at the
resident level may reveal varying results regardless of location or ownership type (Levenson,
2010).
External Factors
As mentioned earlier, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), the
Protecting Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA), and the growth of Accountable Care Organizations
(ACOs) may have impacted the desirable reduction in percentages of short-stay pressure ulcers
that are new or worsened, long-stay physical restraints, antipsychotic use, and moderate to severe
pain. Financial incentives for improved performance suggest the development of strategies and
new approaches to care by SNFs/NFs to meet the criteria and ensure penalties are not appointed.
These penalties can have devastating consequences for facilities who are already underfunded by
Medicaid (AHCA, 2017; Siegel et al, 2014).
Additional external factors that may influence quality measure outcomes include
participation in QIN-QIO initiatives, state or national quality award programs, incentives at the
national, state, or local level by payer sources or regulatory agencies, changes in reimbursement
levels or policies, or other state or local influences.
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Internal Factors
There are several internal factors that may impact the changes in quality measure outcomes
providing additional study limitations. This study did not include factors such as changes in
leadership of individual SNFs/ NFs between 2015 and 2017, the leadership styles, education and/
or experience of facility leaders (including the Administrator and Director of Nursing), or
changes in ownership. Performance based compensation or incentives, availability of resources
or consultants, staffing levels, experience and qualifications of management and direct care staff,
and numbers of ancillary staff members may impact quality measure outcomes.
Policy and Research Implications
This study was the first to consider the impact of Requirements of Participation (RoP) Phase
I on four skilled nursing facility (SNF)/(NF) quality measures. The RoP was the first overhaul of
nursing home regulations in almost thirty years. Prior regulatory updates were made prior to
implementation of the quality measures, providing little opportunity for quantitative
measurement of potential impact of the changes on quality in SNFs/NFs. This study has added
to existing knowledge by providing quantitative data regarding the impact of regulatory
stringency on four SNF/NF quality measures.
Previous literature has provided mixed results regarding the impact of regulatory stringency
on quality in nursing homes. While the results of this study indicates a significant and positive
change in quality measure outcomes relating to the percentage of antipsychotic use, physical
restraints, moderate to severe pain, and pressure ulcers for nursing home residents, it also
suggests the influence of ownership and location (state) on the quality measures for Skilled
Nursing Facilities/ Nursing Facilities. More research is needed to explore these influences in
addition to various patient characteristics and demographic factors (Yuan et al, 2018). A more
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robust study inclusive of all quality measures is recommended, using annual data for
comparison. Consideration of staffing levels, payer mix, acuity, and retention and turnover of
key staff, including facility leadership (Administrator and Director of Nursing) is recommended.
Retention, turnover, training, and experience of facility staff completing the MDS should also be
considered as a means of comparison.
There are several policy implications for the results of this study. In the past, policy makers
have looked to regulatory stringency to ‘fix’ quality problems in SNFs/NFs. Given the costs of
compliance for SNFs/NFs, and the resources necessary for oversight of regulatory compliance
and enforcement, consideration of quantitative methods to determine effectiveness are
paramount. It also provides an opportunity for policy makers to question the variances amongst
states and providers; are those responsible for ensuring compliance applying the regulations
consistently? Is the level of oversight appropriate? Policy makers should also consider
opportunities to improve the reliability and validity of the MDS data used to establish the quality
measures. Without accurate data, it is impossible to determine the impact of regulatory
stringency on quality outcomes.
Lastly, policy makers should consider therapeutic jurisprudence in lawmaking and oversight
of SNFs/NFs (Kapp, 2000). Feedback from stakeholders, including residents, is imperative to
quality of life and quality of care for those residing in nursing homes. Factoring resident
satisfaction and quality of life when considering the impact of regulatory stringency, as they are
the most important declaration of all.
Conclusion
Long-term care is one of the most highly regulated industries in the U.S. On November
28, 2016, Phase I of the Final Rule for Reform of Requirements of Participation (RoP) for long-
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term care facilities was implemented by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
Given the scant research on the effectiveness of regulatory stringency on improving quality in
nursing homes, the hefty costs and a lack of potential increases in funding at the state or federal
levels, the potential effects of the RoP were questionable.
A review of the literature resulted in few evidence-based studies conducted apropos the
implementation nursing home quality measures. The RoP of 2016 was the first major overhaul
of SNF/NF regulations since 1991. Quality measures were not implemented until 2002, therefore
opportunities to conduct quantitative studies pre- and post-implementation of regulatory
requirements have been limited. Studies included in the literature review found inconsistencies
in regulatory compliance and enforcement amongst surveyors (Castle & Ferguson, 2010;
Winzelberg, 2003), differing philosophies in regulation and control of markets (Mukamel et al,
2011). Reimbursement, patient acuity, payer mix, staffing levels, and competency of staff were
identified as additional factors impacting quality measures and regulatory compliance in nursing
homes (Blankart, Foster & Mor, 2019; Grabowski et al, 2008, Gruneir & Mor, 2008).
The results of this study indicate a significant decrease in the mean percentage of longstay residents with antipsychotic use, long-stay physical restraints, and long-stay moderate to
severe pain when comparing quarters one through four pre-(2015) and post-implementation
(2017) of the RoP. The percentage of short-stay residents with new or worsening pressure ulcers
observed a significant decrease in mean for quarters two through four when comparing 2015 and
2017. Logistic models indicate the influence of ownership and location (state) on quality
measure odds ratios. That said, there are several additional factors that must be considered to
determine the influence that patient, demographic, internal, or external factors may have on the
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results. Regardless, the results provide invaluable, preliminary information for policy makers
and providers regarding the impact of Phase I of the RoP, as well as important considerations for
future research.
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